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Signature of Borrower
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BOR 2-1 Ed. Apr. '73
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it warns the consumer of the consequences of uttering a false statement; it provides
an attestation clause on the statement itself, whereby the loan officer can indicate
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0 Corporal Punishment in the Public Schools:
The Legal Questions
INTRODUCTIONP UBLIC EDUCATION in the United States has come a long way since the
one-room schoolhouse days. This phenomenal growth has been paced
by the controversy surrounding the use of corporal punishment as a
means of enforcing discipline in the schools. From the oldest reported
case reaching the issue of corporal punishment' back in 1833 down to
the present,2 the proponents of corporal punishment have had to defend
their actions in the courts from a wide variety of attacks based on
criminal law, tort law, state statutes, school board regulations and, most
recently, constitutional guarantees. Although the attacks on corporal
punishment have been largely unsuccessful, the recognition by the courts
of the substantive and procedural constitutional rights of students who
I Commonwealth v. Fell, 11 Haz. Reg. 179 (Pa. Com. P. 1833).
2 Simns v. Waln, Civil No. 4526 (S.D. Ohio, filed Sept. 18, 1973).
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attend public schools3 in the last fifteen years has sparked new constitu-
tional challenges. The early cases generally treated corporal punishment
in one of three contexts: (a) in criminal prosecutions by the state against
a teacher for assault and battery on a pupil, (b) in civil actions for
damages for physical injuries resulting from the use of corporal punish-
ment on a pupil, and (c) in cases where a teacher is a party to an action
arising out of his dismissal for use or misuse of corporal punishment.4
The Supreme Court did not rule directly on the regulation of student
behavior per se until Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist.5 in 19696 and
the first appellate "hairstyle" decision 7 was not decided until 1965.8
Although the most litigated area recently concerns student expulsions9 the
topic of corporal punishment has been in the courts, and with more
litigation pending, needs careful scrutiny.
The first case to attempt a constitutional challenge of corporal
punishment was Murphy v. Kerrigan,10 a federal court case in Boston
seeking injunctive relief against the use of corporal punishment in the
public schools. This case was prompted by the following incidents: For
alleged misconduct, Jeannette Watts, a 14-year-old student at a school
in Boston, was struck by her teacher on the cheek and fell as a result of
the blow. Another teacher grabbed her by the hair, forced her to the
floor, and slapped her in the face. In a similar incident, for disciplinary
reasons, a teacher took hold of a ninth grader, a girl of 14, punched her
in the face, and ripped a pierced earring off her ear. A 13-year-old boy
received two blows on the palm of each hand with a bamboo rattan,
causing sharp twinges, a welt, and broken blood vessels under the skin.
Other instances of corporal punishment were also charged."
Incidents such as these are not restricted to the Boston area. The
American Civil Liberties Union reports that
... Dallas teachers... readily talk about spanking students for
3 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (religion and compulsory education);
Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (free speech and public
schools); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Ed., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 930 (1961) (due process and expulsion). See generally Note, Emerging
Rights of High School Students: The Law Comes of Age, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 349
(1971); Comment, Procedural Due Process in Secondary Schools, 54 MARQ. L. REv.
358 (1971); Note, The Emerging Law of Students' Rights, 23 ARK. L REv. & B.A.J.
619 (1970).
4Note, Right of a Teacher to Administer Corporal Punishment to a Student, 5
WASHBURN LJ. 75, 88 (1965).
5 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
6 E. REuTrTR, LEGAL AsPEcTs OF CoTrroL OF STUDENT Acrivrrs BY PUBLIC SCHOOL
AuTrHorrEs 6 (1970) [hereinafter cited as REuTrER].
7 Leonard v. School Committee of Attleboro, 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965).
8 RJTrER, supra n. 6 at 15.
91d. at 50.
10Civil No. 69-1174-W (D. Mass., filed Nov. 7, 1969), noted in 6 HARv. Civ.
Riorrs--Crv. Lm. L. REv. 583 (1971).
"Note, 6 HARv. Crv. RIGHTS-CIV. Lm. L. REv. 583 at n.1 (1971).
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misspelling words, inattentiveness and failure to say "sir," among
other transgressions. One teacher at Stockard Junior High... has
what he calls "double stamp day" on Wednesdays. A student's
transgressions are punishable on that day by double the number of
licks administered during the remainder of the week. "I do what I
call 'warming them up' with five or six taps and then give one hard
lick," the teacher said. Students are spanked in front of the room
at the conclusion of the class for failure to say "sir," entering the
class with shirttails out, or throwing at and missing the wastepaper
basket, he said.12
The same report indicates that similar situations exist in many other
cities. 3 Obvious abuses such as these coupled with modem theories of
education have prompted over 60 anti-corporal punishment groups, plus
the National Education Association [hereinafter cited as NEAl to work
for the abolition of authorized aggression in the nation's schools.14 This
has prompted one commentator to state,
Educational writers and speakers, almost as a unified voice, say the
prime function of the school is to develop effective citizens for our
democracy. It is therefore disquieting to examine the kinds and
extent of authority that some school officials will spend energy
and tax money to attempt to justify in court.15
It is also disquieting to many educators and parents when they
examine the conduct of some teachers, especially in light of modem
educational and psychological theories on the potential harms of corporal
punishment. "Present theories in this area reject the idea that
physical punishment is the best method of developing the child's
character or that it is the best method of controlling child behavior."'-"
"Corporal punishment further has deleterious effects on children. Insofar
as it relies on fear, it disrupts the learning process by repressing the
natural tendency of children to explore."' 17 There is a substantial body of
authority in educational research that indicates corporal punishment does
more harm than good because of the resentment it causes between teacher
and pupil and because the atmosphere it generates is not believed to be
12 A. REITMAN, J. FOLLMAN, E. LADD, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
24 (ACLU REPORTS mimeo, 1972) [hereinafter cited as REITMAN].
13 ld. at 25.
14Westin, Should School Spankings Be Outlawed? PARADE, Nov. 11, 1973, at 11.
15 REuTTER, supra n. 6 at 52.
1620 CLEVE. ST. L. REv. 560, 570 n.77 (1971), citing R. AMSTERDAM, CONSTRUcTrvE
CLASSROOM DISCIPLINE AND PRACTICE 82 (1957); N. CuTrs & N. MOSELEY, TEACHING
THE DISORDERLY PUPIL 34 (1957); J. HowARD, CHILDREN IN TROUBLE 239 (1970);
R. RREIKURs & L. GREY, LOGICAL CONSEQUENCES: A NEW APPROACH TO DISCIPLINE
(1968); E. PHILLIPS, D. WEINER, N. HARING, DISCIPLINE, ACHIEVEMENT AND MENTAL
HEALTH (1960); H. DOUGLASS, MODERN ADMINISTRATION OF SECONDARY SCHOOLS
(1954).
176 H v. Civ. RiGns-Civ. Lm. L. REv. 583, 584 (1971) citing Silverman, Disci-
pline: Its Psychological and Educational Aspects, 42 MENTAL HYGIENE 277 (1958).
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conducive to education.'8 Other criticisms of corporal punishment include
charges that corporal punishment is a survival of an earlier barbaric age,
a carry-over from the days of primitive savagery, ill-becoming the life of
present-day civilized man.19 Falk declared that corporal punishment was
evidence of the continuing class struggle. To teach a child to accept
discipline by force is to teach him that he must stay within his class,
whereas, according to Falk, intelligent Americans are striving to develop
a classless society.20 Keith James in the published version of his Ph.D.
dissertation indicates that corporal punishment may really have been an
admission of fear and insecurity on the part of those who used and
advocated it. "Such persons were incapable of handling pupil's problems
in constructive ways. Corporal punishment was used by them in an effort
to compensate for their own weaknesses.' ' n
Yet, not all educators are against corporal punishment. The NEA
reported in 1970 that little change had occurred in the past decade in the
generally widespread teacher approval of judicious use of corporal
punishment to discipline pupils. A nationwide sample survey of public
school classroom teachers, conducted by the NEA Research Division
in late 1969 asked the following question: Do you favor judicious use of
corporal punishment as a disciplinary measure in school? Responses were
indicated separately regarding corporal punishment in elementary and in
secondary school. Approximately two-thirds of the respondents approved
of corporal punishment in elementary school and almost one-half
approved of it in secondary school. 21
It should be clear from this background that there is a wide disparity
of opinion regarding the use of corporal punishment even in the
education profession itself. It is not the purpose of this comment to
resolve that conflict. Clearer, although certainly not easier, questions are
presented in a legal context. Most states have a well-settled body of law
authorizing some form of physical force as a type of discipline. Further
litigation in this area, unless preceded by legislative changes would seem
futile. Recent federal cases attacking the constitutionality of the various
state policies, although largely unsuccessful, persist. These issues are by
no means settled. The sheer number of persons affected daily by these
issues merits a detailed analysis of the questions involved in a
constitutional challenge of corporal punishment. A brief summary of the
state laws, a survey of the recent federal cases and an analysis of
constitutional arguments will be discussed in the balance of this comment.
18Seo 20 CLEvE. ST. L. REv. 560, 570 n.78 (1971).
19 K. JAMES, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 8-9 (1963).
20H. FALK, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT: A SOCIAL INTERPRETATION OF ITSTHEORY AND
PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES (1941).
2 JAMES, supra n. 19 at 10.
2248 NEA RESEARCH BULL. 46, 48-49 (1970).
[Vol. 7:3
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THE VARIOUS STATE LAW APPROACHES
Early in the development of the common law in the United States,
the courts began to use the doctrine of in loco parentis. When pupils are
under the jurisdiction of the school, teachers are said to stand in the place
of the parent in relation to the student. This doctrine developed because
it was felt that a teacher, in order to properly carry out the functions
of the school, needed authority to direct and discipline students
commensurate with the parents' right. This relationship of the teacher to
the child was the essential element in establishing the standard of
reasonableness in regard to punishment. With this standard the question
is: Under similar circumstances, would it be reasonable for a parent
to inflict the punishment? The in loco parentis doctrine has also been
the basis for some state statutory schemes.
23
The Case Law
The case law has extended the doctrine of in loco parentis to the
point that there is now authority for the proposition that the teacher has
the right to use corporal punishment and that right cannot be taken
away. The American Law Institute is apparently in accord with this
position,24 at least for public schools. In Indiana State Personnel Board
v. Jackson25 the Indiana Supreme Court upheld a teacher's actions in
striking a student-patient in a state institutional school. In his concurring
opinion, Justice Arterburn defined the right of the teacher and declared
that this right could not be taken away by stating,
A teacher, and a parent, have not only the right but the obligation
to discipline a child, if necessary using corporal punishment, for the
good of such child, as well as the protection of third parties offended
or injured by the actions of such child.
23 For a discussion of the in loco parentis doctrine see generally, E. REuTrf & R.
HAMILTON, THE LAW OF PUBLIc EDucATIoN 284-290, 514-515 (1970). For the
argument that in loco parentis constitutes only a temporary delegation of parental
powers with few of the responsibilities and therefore determines neither the teacher's
privilege of punishment nor the extent of the privilege and that in loco parentis is
insufficient grounds on which to base the authority to punish students physically, see
Taylor, With Temperate Rod: Maintaining Academic Order in Secondary Schools, 56
Ky. L. REv. 617, 624 (1970).
24REsTATEmENT (Second) OF TORTS § 153 (1965), states: "(2) One who is in charge
of the education or training of a child as a public officer is privileged to inflict such
reasonable punishments as are necessary for the child's proper education or training,
notwithstanding the parent's prohibitions or wishes."
In explanation Comment d states:
In such cases, the fact that the parent expresses a desire that the child should
not be punished in a particular way or for a particular offense does not restrict
the privilege of school authorities. The will of the parent cannot defeat the
policy of the State. The school authorities, therefore, have such disciplinary
privilege as is reasonably necessary to secure the education of the child
irrespective of the wishes of its parent. The same is true where the parent sends
the child to a public school as a matter of economy or choice.
Subsection (1) of § 153 states a different rule for private schools. Subsection (2)
and Comment d were expressly disapproved by a federal court in Glaser v. Marietta,
351 F. Supp. 555, 560 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
25 244 Ind. 321, 192 N.E2d 740 (1963).
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I might further add that I have serious doubts that a teacher
confronted with such a situation and responsibility under the law for
maintaining order and a respect for authority before a classroom of
pupils, can be deprived by a "rule" of the right to use physical force
to eliminate such a disturbance. As long as teachers or parents are
obligated under the law to educate, teach and train children, they
may not be denied the necessary means of carrying out their
responsibility as such teachers or parents.26
In City of Macomb v. Gould,27 an Illinois appellate court upheld
the conviction of a teacher under a city ordinance prohibiting fighting.
The majority of the court affirmed, preferring to leave the question of
excessiveness (i.e., Did the force used cross the boundary line from
permissible force into fighting?) to the jury. However, Justice Stouder in
filing a vigorous dissent based on the teacher's right to use corporal
punishment stated, "A teacher not only has the right but the duty to
discipline children under his tutelage. Failure to do this is tantamount
to the failure of a teacher to perform his function, that of teaching." 28 In
fairness it should be pointed out that these two cases represent the farthest
extent to which the courts have been willing to go and not a majority rule.
The Legislation
There are basically five types of statutes in the United States today.
New Jersey29 is the only state to expressly prohibit corporal punishment
in the schools.3 0 At the opposite end of the spectrum a few states expressly
permit the teacher to use corporal punishment. For example, California's
statute allows the governing board of any school district to adopt rules
and regulations authorizing the administration of corporal punishment.3'
Florida's law3 2 allows the teacher to use corporal punishment but not
26 Id. at 336-37, 192 N.E.2d at 747-48.
27 104 M. App.2d 361, 244 N.E.2d 634 (1969).
28 Id. at 365, 244 N.E.2d at 636.
29 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-1 (1968) states:
Corporal punishment of pupilsNo person employed or engaged in a school or educational institution, whetherpublic or private, shall inflict or cause to be inflicted corporal punishment upon
a pupil attending such school or institution; but any such person may, withinthe scope of his employment, use and apply such amounts of force as is
reasonable and necessary:
(1) to quell a disturbance, threatening physical injury to others;(2) to obtain possession of weapons or other dangerous objects upon theperson or within the control of a pupil;
(3) for the purpose of self-defense; and(4) for the protection of persons or property; and such acts, or any ofthem, shall not be construed to constitute corporal punishment within themeaning and intendment of this section. Every resolution, bylaw, rule, ordinance,
or other act or authority permitting or authorizing corporal punishment to beinflicted upon a pupil attending a school or educational institution shall be void.3048 NEA RESEARCH BULL. 46, 47 (1970).
31 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 10854 (West 1969).
32 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 231.09(3) (Supp. 1973), § 232.27 (1961).
462 [Vol. 7:3
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before consulting with the principal. Montana has a similar statute
33 that
requires corporal punishment to be administered only when necessary and
in the presence of both the teacher and the principal. Notice to a parent
is also required except in cases of flagrant disobedience to authority.
Nevada discourages but permits the use of corporal punishment only if it
cannot be avoided and if the parents are notified and then only if not
"... on or about the head of any pupil."
3 4 In South Dakota teachers are
allowed ". . . to administer such physical punishment on an insubordinate
or disobedient student that is reasonable and necessary for supervisory
control over the students.... ."35 Ohio has a similar law.
36 A third type of
statute provides that one of the teacher's duties is to maintain order and
discipline among his pupils. States with statutes in this category usually
have no other statutory authority expressly authorizing or forbidding
corporal punishment in carrying out this duty.
37
A few states have codified the doctrine of in loco parentis.
38 None of
the statutes specifically refers to corporal punishment but they have been
interpreted as creating that right.39 The fifth type of statute relating to
the teacher's authority is found in the penal code and the definition
of assault and battery. These statutes typically exempt the teacher from
criminal punishment if the force used was not excessive and was used as
a legitimate form of discipline.4 From this brief overview it is apparent
that the states are in conflict as to the propriety and legality of the use of
corporal punishment. The only state whose statute appears to leave no
room for doubt as to permissible conduct is New Jersey which expressly
forbids corporal punishment. The daily interpretation of these statutes,
which are too often vague, is left not to the courts or the legislature but
to the various school boards and ultimately to each classroom teacher.
The wide variety of results even under the same statute should be readily
apparent. In most states the same child is subjected to different standards
in each classroom he or she enters. The statutory standards, in reality are
not standards at all and therefore fall far short of their intended goals.
RECENT FEDERAL CASES
Today there are four reported federal cases directly reaching
33 MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 75-6109 (1971).
34 NEV. REV. STAT. § 392.465 (1971).
35 S.D. COMPELED LAWS ANN. § 13-32-2 (1967).
36 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3319.41 (Page 1972).
37 E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-1224 (1963); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 77-8-3(D) (1953);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 28A:67.100 (1970).
38 The statutory in loco parentis states include: Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70,
§ 6-114 (1972); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit 24, § 13-1317 (Supp. 1973-74); and
West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18A-5-1 (1971).
39 Guerrieri v. Tyson, 147 Pa. Super. 505, 24 A.2d 468 (1942).
40 E.g., MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-3-107 (Supp. pamphlet 1974); N.Y. PENAL
LAw § 35.10(1) (McKinney 1967).
COMMENTSSpring, 1974]
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constitutional objections to corporal punishment.41 There is also a case
currently pending in the southern district of Ohio . 2 Although the four
reported cases all rejected the constitutional arguments, the nature of the
cases involved and the language used in the cases does not close off
forever other constitutional challenges using the same or similar issues
as a basis of attack. A fifth case, Murphy v. Kerrigan,43 was a consent
decree whereby both parties agreed that corporal punishment would be
banned in the Boston Public Schools so long as the current Boston School
Committee was in office. Being a consent decree it can be considered
as having little, if any, precedent value.
In Ware v. Estes,44 a federal judge, sitting alone, ruled on the
constitutionality of corporal punishment as it was being applied by
the Dallas Independent School District. The case was brought as a class
action with the plaintiffs claiming to represent "all students.., in the
Dallas Independent School District who are opposed to the use of corporal
punishment as a method of discipline." 45 The plaintiffs were granted class
action status45 but that was the extent of their success. They charged that
any corporal punishment administered without parental or student consent
deprives them of their rights to due process under the fourteenth
amendment becaue any utilization of corporal punishment is arbitrary,
capricious and unrelated to any legitimate educational purpose. The
school district countered with its rules and policy which authorize
principals to administer any reasonable punishment, including corporal
punishment. 47 Under this system the principal may delegate any of his
punishment duties to the assistant principal. The teachers are not free to
use corporal punishment until the student has been referred to a Pupil
Personnel Committee for study. The committee can authorize the teacher
to use corporal punishment, but only in the presence of another adult and
then not without the written consent of the child's parent. After any
corporal punishment is administered the principal is required to file a
report with the Assistant to the Associate Superintendent for Instruction. 48
The judge treated these arguments by noting that "[f]rom the evidence
presented, the Court has no doubt that the practice of corporal punish-
ment has been abused by some of the seven thousand-odd teachers in the
4
.
1 Gonyaw v. Gray, 361 F. Supp. 366 (D. Vt. 1973); Glaser v. Marietta, 351 F. Supp.555 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Ware v. Estes, 328 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Tex. 1971), af'd per
curiam, 458 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972); Sims
v. Bd. of Ed. of Independent School Dist. No. 22, 329 F. Supp. 678 (D.N.M. 1971).
42 Sims v. Waln, Civil No. 4526 (S.D. Ohio, filed Sept. 18, 1973),.
43 Civil No. 69-1174-W (D. Mass. 1970).
44328 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Tex. 1970), afl'd per curiam, 458 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972).
45 Id. at 658.
48 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
AKRtON LAW R ¢vmw [Vol. 7:3
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Dallas Independent School District" 49 but holding that abuse does not
make the policy itself unconstitutional. By taking this position the Judge
seems dangerously close to ignoring reality and only seeing what is
supposed to be there.
The parties also presented experts to show that corporal punishment
bears no reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of
the State. In this battle of the experts, the Judge chose to believe those
aligned with the defendant's point of view and held that it was not shown
that the policy was "wholly unrelated to the competency of the state in
determining its educational policy."'50 Judge Taylor also rejected any
claim of parents' rights being superior by saying that the actions of the
school board have only to be reasonable to outweigh any parental rights. 51
For this proposition the judge cited Cornwell v. State Bd. of Ed.,52 a case
dealing with who decides what should be included in the curriculum, not
whether a child could or could not be beaten without parental consent.
The second part of plaintiff's two-pronged attack was the contention
that corporal punishment is a violation of the eighth amendment's ban on
cruel and unusual punishments. The judge dismissed this argument by
echoing the state statutory and case law scheme that authorizes corporal
punishment. Although it is true that laws allowing certain types of
punishment bear on the question of what the public sentiment is towards
that type of punishment, the eighth amendment was embodied in our
Constitution to provide a standard other than current legislative thinking
by which to measure the permissibility of a given punishment. By failing
to recognize this distinction Ware v. Estes failed to effectively deal with
the eighth amendment question.
Less than 30 days after the initial Ware v. Estes decision, Judge
Eubanks, sitting in the New Mexico District Court, rendered a decision
on Sims v. Board of Ed. of the Independent School Dist. No. 2 2.53 This
case was also brought as a class action against the school board because
of its policy on corporal punishment. Plaintiffs fashioned their claim as a
prayer for equitable relief asking for: (1) a declaratory judgment holding
that the statewide custom of corporal punishment "is a denial of due
process of law and equal protection of the laws, abridges the privileges
and immunities of students, and constitutes a cruel and unusual punish-
ment,"' 54 (2) both a preliminary and permanent injunction against the
defendants prohibiting them from administering corporal punishment, and
49 Id.
50 ld. at 659.
51 id. at 660.
52 314 F. Supp. 340 (D. Md. 1969), afl'd, 428 F.2d 471 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 942 (1970).
53 329 F. Supp. 678 (D.N.M. 1971).
54 Id. at 681.
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(3) a mandatory injunction against defendants to adopt and implement
a new policy statement with respect to discipline of students which would
conform to the Constitution and progressive educational expertise. 55 Plain-
tiffs based their causes of action on due process and equal protection
grounds, on eighth amendment cruel and unusual grounds, on abridgement
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the fourteenth amendment by
imposing on the physical integrity and personal dignity it guarantees, and
on first amendment free speech grounds because of the chilling effect of
corporal punishment on the exercise of expression.56 The judge decided
these issues by holding that either the rights claimed did not exist or when
he found "existing" rights that they were not violated. Lest he be
misunderstood the judge, almost sarcastically, delineated his holding:
Let there be no misunderstanding as to the precise holding herein.
The role of a federal court in adjudicating claims that state school
regulations violate the constitutional rights of pupils is relatively
narrow. I do not hold that any school regulation, however loosely
formed, is necessarily valid. I do not hold that school authorities
have the authority to require a pupil to lay aside any constitutional
right when he enrolls. I do not hold that school authorities may act
arbitrarily or capriciously in the formulation or in the enforcement
of school regulations. I do hold that the defendants have the power
to promulgate and to enforce reasonable regulations governing
students in attendance with power to impose responsible non-
discriminatory corporal punishment for breaches thereof without
violating any federally protected constitutional rights of pupils.
57
The administrative red tape surrounding corporal punishment in New
Mexico was substantially less than that confronting the court in Ware
v. Estes. The Teacher's Handbook in reference to the use of "spanking"
mandated that "When this is necessary, the punishment shall be adminis-
tered by the school principal or if administered by the teacher it should
be witnessed by the principal or his delegated representative in his
absence."6o Also in this case the plaintiffs did not allege or attempt to
prove the widespread abuse of corporal punishment that was an under-
lying theme in Ware v. Estes. The attack here was more straightforward.
After a better reasoned but not exhaustive opinion, the result was the same,
and corporal punishment was given the court's constitutional blessing.
The next federal case to be decided offers some hope for the
opponents of corporal punishment. Glaser v. Marietta,9 was an action by
a student in the Northgate School District of Pennsylvaniaeo and his
55 Id.
56ld.
57 Id. at 690.
58 Id. at 680.
59 351 F. Supp. 555 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
60 Northgate is a suburb of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
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mother seeking an injunction against the school district to enjoin it from
authorizing corporal punishment. In this case the student (a 12-year-old
boy) was given three "medium strokes" on the buttocks with a paddle by
an assistant principal after he had interrogated the plaintiff and another
student and decided that the plaintiff was responsible for some fisticuffs
in the classroom. The judge chose to view this case as offering two
questions for decision. First, is the application of corporal punishment
unconstitutional per se under the fifth, eighth and fourteenth amendments?
Second, is there a violation of parental rights by administering corporal
punishment over the objections of the parents?
On the first issue the court reviewed the battle of the experts, declared
it a standoff, and then gave the decision to the state but added, "However,
it is not for us to choose sides in this battle of the experts because the
wisdom or desirability of utilizing corporal punishment as a means of
discipline in the schools is not for this court to decide."'" It is unclear
why the court takes this stand. If it had chosen to believe the plaintiffs'
experts and found that corporal punishment was harmful to the student
and does not aid discipline then there would have been no justification
for its use and it would therefore be, if not cruel and unusual, at least
a violation of the courts' own reasonableness test.
Still maintaining that it was not taking sides in the battle of the
experts the court discussed the special nature of the immaturity of children
and then went on to say: "A method of parental control originating in the
mists of prehistoric times, commended in Biblical references, sanctioned
by Blackstone's Commentaries and defended by many of today's child
psychologists, is not lightly to be declared unconstitutional"62 (emphasis
added). The court then reasoned that if the parent could administer
corporal punishment (because Blackstone and the Bible tells him so) then
the school system could do the same under the legislative grant of in loco
parentis rights. This reasoning answers the question before asking it. What
the plaintiff was attacking here was not the fact that the doctrine exists
but the propriety of that doctrine. In justifying corporal punishment by
saying the legislature has given that power to the school authorities Judge
Weis never effectively reached the real issue. In these days of growing
bureaucracy and big government, administrative arms of the government
are getting further and further away from the people. It is not realistic
to assume in our urban, mobile society that administrative officials are
attuned to the wishes of each parent as they were 100 years ago, when
in loco parentis was still developing.
Judge Weis impliedly recognized this change in circumstance when
he held that the parental rights were superior to the legislatively
substituted parental rights of the school administration. Quoting from
61351 F. Supp. at 557.
62 Id. at 558 (emphasis added).
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Stanley v. Illinois,63 Judge Weis said: "The Court has frequently empha-
sized the importance of the family. The rights to conceive and to raise
one's children have been deemed 'essential' [citations], 'basic civil rights
of man' [citation], and '(r)ights far more precious.. . than property
rights,'.. .,64 In discussing the rights of the parents versus the rights of
the school board, the court held that whether the balancing test is one
of "reasonably necessary regulation" or that of "powerful countervailing
interest" the result would be the same. "The facts in this case demonstrate
that the regulation satisfies neither -test and that the School District has
established no reason why it should prevail over the asserted claim of
basic parental right."65 If the school board could not show any reason
why corporal punishment was more important than the parent's right to
discipline (in other words there was no compelling interest strong enough)
why could it show that there was a compelling interest stronger than the
child's physical integrity? Be that as it may, the case does stand for
the proposition that school officials cannot administer corporal punishment
over the objections of parents. The holding is based on recent Supreme
Court pronouncements on parental rights and is good authority for
overruling the propositions advanced in Indiana State Personnel Bd. v.
Jackson and City of Macomb v. Gould discussed earlier.64
Perhaps the strongest case to date for corporal punishment is
Gonyaw v. Gray,67 a district court case ruling on a motion to dismiss
a civil rights action brought by parents and students against the local
school board. The plaintiffs (two 12-year-olds and their parents) sought
damages under 42 U.S.C. section 198368 and a declaratory judgment that
the Vermont statute authorizing corporal punishment69 is unconstitutional.
The judge prefaced his ruling on the motion by noting that an essential
63405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
64 351 F. Supp. at 559-60.
65 Id. at 561.
66 See text accompanying nn. 24-28 supra.
67 361 F. Supp. 366 (D. Vt. 1973). The companion case Ladue v. Moffatt, 361 F.
Supp. 366 (D. Vt. 1973), Civil No. 73-2675 (2d Cir., Nov. 27, 1973), was dismissed
after appeal because the student's parents separated and moved out of the state.
Richard Kohn, who was attorney of record in both cases, has indicated to this author
that the American Civil Liberties Union was ready to appeal the Gonyaw case but
could not obtain the parents' consent. Because of these cases Representative Edward
Farrow from Procter, Vt., has introduced a bill in the current session of the state
legislature, H.B. 365 (Jan. 1974), which would do away with corporal punishment
in the Vermont schools.
68 This section provides that a person acting under color of state law who deprives
another of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution shall be liable
to the injured party in an action at law or suit in equity.6 9 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1161 (1958):
A teacher or principal of a school or a superintendent or a school director on
request of and in the presence of the teacher, may resort to any reasonable
form of punishment, including corporal punishment, and to any reasonable
degree, for the purposes of securing obedience on the part of any child enrolled
in such school, or for his correction, or for the purpose of securing or
maintaining order in and control of such school.
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element to recovery in both cases under section 1983 would be the
plaintiff establishing an invasion of federally protected constitutional
rights, mere tortious conduct not being enough.70 After examining eighth
amendment, equal protection, due process and vagueness arguments,
Chief Judge Holden found no such federally protected constitutional
rights. For the first three arguments he relied on Ware, Sims and Glaser.
To defeat the vagueness contentions of the plaintiff the criminal statutes
were used as a boundary line. "[I]f the punishment is excessive or
improper, the teacher is guilty of assault and battery."' 71 This deterrent, the
court said, kept the statute from sweeping "unnecessarily broadly" into
"the area of protected freedoms." What those protected freedoms are and
why "excessive" and "improper" are not vague is not told. The real reason
for the court's decision is most probably found in the judge's personal
attitude toward paddling in school. "In any event, it [paddling] is a sanction
which simply is not serious enough to require the prerequisite of a formal
hearing."' 72 (Emphasis added.) Without so much as an inquiry into the
"seriousness" of corporal punishment the motion to dismiss was granted.
Despite (or perhaps because of) these rulings the Ohio American
Civil Liberties Union has filed a suit in the Ohio Southern District Court.73
The case is a damage action against certain teachers and members of the
school board. The defendants have filed an answer, there has been one
pretrial conference, and the case is currently set for trial on Sept. 23, 1974.
According to Leonard Schwartz of the Ohio A.C.L.U.74 the plaintiffs are
basing their claim on four grounds. The first is a due process argument
based on Lopez v. Williams.75 That case involved the procedure necessary
to expel a student from a public high school. Judge Carl Rubin, who is
hearing the Sims case, also sat on the three-judge panel that decided
Lopez. The second basis of attack is that corporal punishment as
administered in the Dayton Public Schools is cruel and unusual under the
eighth amendment as interpreted by Jackson v. Bishop76 (the corporal
punishment in the prisons case), and Furman v. Georgia77 (the death
penalty case). The third cause of action is based on interference with
parents' rights under Glaser v. Marietta.78 The fourth cause of action
however, is the one that will add a new wrinkle to the developing case law
in this area. Alleging a violation of equal protection, the plaintiffs hope to
prove that corporal punishment in the Dayton Public Schools is racially
70 361 F. Supp. at 368.
71d. at 370 quoting Melen v. McLaughlin, 107 Vt. 111, 115, 176 A. 297, 299 (1934)
(emphasis added).
72 Id. at 371 (emphasis added).
73 Sims v. Wain, Civil No. 4526 (S.D. Ohio, filed Sept. 18, 1973).
74 Per telephone conversations with this author on Nov. 14, 1973, and Jan. 10, 1974.
75 Civil No. 7167 (S.D. Ohio, Sept. 12, 1973).
76 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968); see text accompanying nn. 83-94 infra.
77 408 U.S. 238 (1972); see text accompanying nn. 95 & 96 infra.
78351 F. Supp. 555 (W.D. Pa. 1972); see text accompanying n. 59-66 supra.
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biased, in that white teachers administer corporal punishment to black
students in a proportion so much greater than that of corporal punishment
to whites that it is more a reflection of their racial bias than legitimate
punishment. Confident that they can overcome the proof problems via
discovery, attorneys for the plaintiff are currently assembling the necessary
data. Although the outcome of the case cannot be second-guessed at
this time, it has at least proceeded further than Gonyaw v. Gray.
Significantly, at trial, plaintiffs will have the opportunity to prove all
their contentions, not just the racial bias claim.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS
As indicated in the previous section, the attacks against corporal
punishment based on denial of constitutional rights have been largely
unsuccessful. The previous section also pointed out the weaknesses of
those decisions. The cases to date have failed to fully develop the eighth
and fourteenth amendment considerations relevant to a full and final
determination of the rights involved. To date only four district court
judges and three appellate judges have reported their opinions on these
issues.79 Although not favorable to anti-corporal punishment advocates
they certainly do not close the door to further discussion. The case
pending 80 and the day-to-day reality of corporal punishment for many
children necessitate a full discussion of the anti-corporal punishment view.
Changing Standards
"The [8th] amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."&
The Supreme Court has approached the cases dealing with eighth
amendment violations in two ways. First: whether the punishment itself
is cruel and unusual and second: whether it is clearly excessive in
comparison to those meted out elsewhere for similar offenses.8 2
The leading case in the area of corporal punishment and the eighth
amendment is a circuit court case, Jackson v. Bishop.83 In Jackson three
inmates of the Arkansas penitentiary brought separate actions to bar the
use of the strap as a disciplinary measure in Arkansas' penal institutions.
"The straps used in Arkansas vary somewhat but all are similar. Each is
of leather and from 3 h to 51/2 feet in length, and about 4 inches wide
and 14 inch thick. Each has a wooden handle 8 to 12 inches long." 84 The
79 Judge Holden in Gonyaw, n. 67 supra; Judge Weis in Glaser, n. 59 supra; Judge
Eubanks in Sims, n. 53 supra; Judge Taylor in Ware, n. 44 supra, and Judges Dyer,
Skelton & Ingraham in Ware, n. 44 supra.
80 Sims v. Wain, Civil No. 4526 (S.D. Ohio, filed Sept. 18, 1973).
81 Chief Justice Warren in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1957).
82 See generally, Comment, Corporal Punishment in the Public Schools, 6 H.xv. Civ.
RIGHTs--CIv. Lm. L. REv. 583, 586 nn. 27 & 28 (1971) and cases cited therein.
83 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
84 Id. at 574.
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whippings were administered by the wardens while the prisoner laid
face down on the concrete. 85 The prison system did have an elaborate
recently enacted regulation system concerning the use of the strap.86
Judge, later Justice, Blackmun held that the use of the strap, regardless
of the safeguards, violated the eighth amendment.
[W]e have no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the use
of the strap in the penitentiaries of Arkansas is punishment which, in
this last third of the 20th century, runs afoul of the eighth amend-
ment; that the strap's use, irrespective of any precautionary conditions
which may be imposed, offends contemporary concepts of decency
and human dignity and precepts of civilization which we profess to
possess; and that it also violates those standards of good conscience
and fundamental fairness enunciated by this court in the Carey and
Lee cases.87
The court reached that result even though at that time other states had
statutes that specifically allowed whippings as a form of punishment.
88
Judge Blackmun quoted from Supreme Court cases where Justices had
warned of the difficulty that would attend the effort to define with
exactness the extent of the eighth amendment.89 He was not, however,
afraid to wrestle with that difficulty. "A principle to be vital, must be
capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth." 9
Nor was he afraid to enunciate his reasons and in so doing denounce
corporal punishment in a civilized society.
Our reasons for this conclusion include the following: (1) We are
not convinced that any rule or regulation.. . however seriously or
sincerely conceived or drawn, will successfully prevent abuse...
(3) Regulations are easily circumvented.... (4) Corporal punish-
ment is easily subject to abuse in the hands of the sadistic and the
unscrupulous. (5) Where power to punish is granted to persons in
lower levels of administrative authority, there is an inherent and
natural difficulty in enforcing the limitations of that power....
(7) Corporal punishment generates hate toward the keepers who
punish and toward the system which permits it. It is degrading to
the punisher and punished alike .... 91 (Emphasis added.)
Jackson has received near unanimous support from the other circuits, 92
85 Id. at 574-75.
86 Id. at 574.
87 Id. at 579.
88 See 404 F.2d 574 n.4.
89 404 F.2d at 577.
9o Id. at 578, quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
91 Id. at 579, 580 (emphasis added).
92 Although no other circuit court has decided the merits of a corporal punishment in
prison case since Jackson, it has been repeatedly cited as a leading case in the areas
of prisoners' rights and development of an eighth amendment standard. See, e.g.,
Rozecki v. Gaughan, 450 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1972); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028
(2d Cir. 1973); Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12
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favorable comment from the Supreme Court 93 and has recently been sug-
gested as a basis for banning corporal punishment in the public schools.94
The Supreme Court has recently ruled on the eighth amendment 95
as it applies to the death penalty. Although the majority were able to
agree on a conclusion their reasons were varied (all nine justices filed
separate opinions), suggesting that the doctrine emanating from the eighth
amendment is by no means settled. Mr. Justice Douglas laid the
groundwork for applying the principles of Furman to school cases when
he said: "There is increasing recognition of the fact that the basic theme
of equal protection is implicit in 'cruel and unusual' punishments. A
penalty should be considered 'unusually' imposed if it is administered
arbitrarily or discriminatorily."9 If a plaintiff could show that corporal
punishment was being administered arbitrarily (for instance, only when
the teacher is in a "bad mood") or discriminatorily (i.e., against only
one race or sex) then there would be a basis for the court to strike down
the punishment even though not willing to hold corporal punishment
in the schools cruel and unusual per se. These cases also raise two other
points of argument based on the eighth and fourteenth amendments:
(1) the effect of showing that corporal punishment has fallen into disuse
elsewhere and (2) the real difficulty presented in policing uniform,
minimum standards.
Corporal Punishment Becoming Obsolete
It has already been shown that corporal punishment has been
abandoned in our prison systems.97 Corporal punishment once used
extensively by sea captains to maintain discipline at sea has been illegal
for almost 80 years.98 Over 150 years ago English military literature
advocated the abolishment of corporal punishment in the British Army
where it had always been used: "... Mhe various secondary or minor
punishments, and the rewards, which are to be considered to be efficient
as substitutes for corporal punishment, should be adopted without
Cir. 1972); Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1972); Wheeler v. Glass, 473
F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1973); Mead v. Parker, 464 F.2d 1108 (9th Cir. 1972).
(2d Cir. 1971); Hayes v. Secretary of Dept. of Public Safety, 455 F.2d 798 (4th
93 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,287-88 (1972).
94 E.g., Note, Constitutional Law--School Law-Restrictions on the Infliction of
Corporal Punishment: Spoiling the Rod, 50 N. CAR. L. REV. 911, 913 (1972); Note,
Corporal Punishment in the Public Schools, 6 HARv. Civ. RIGosrs--Civ. Lm. L. Rv.
583, 588 (1971).
95 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
96 Id. at 249 quoting Goldberg and Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Uncon-
stitutional, 83 HAav. L. REv. 1773, 1790 (1970).
97 See text accompanying nn. 83-91 supra. See also Goldfarb and Singer, Redressing
Prisoners' Grievances, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 175, 197-98 (1970); J. PALMER,
CoNsTIrruoNAL RIGrrs oF PRIsoNERs § 2.8 (1973).
98 Cruelty to seamen 18 U.S.C. § 2191 (1970):
Whoever, being the master of a vessel of the United States, on the high seas, or
any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United
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delay... ."99 The use of corporal punishment in other countries as a
method of school discipline is also on a steady if not rapid decline.
"Corporal punishment is illegal in most western countries outside the
British Isles, and indeed has been gradually disappearing from schools, in
England at least, to the extent that its use is now uncommon."'1 Corporal
punishment has been banned in many major cities and individual school
districts even where the state seemingly would allow it. These cities include
Washington, D.C., New York, Pittsburgh, Baltimore, Chicago and Grosse
Pointe, Michigan, to name a few.10 1 If, as has been pointed out,0e2
comparison with punishment for similar offenses in other communities
is relevant to an eighth amendment determination then the decline in
use of corporal punishment in other contexts and the growing list
of school districts that have banned it become more and more relevant
as the lists grow longer.
Minimum Standards
Although the courts seem to be preoccupied with the problems they
fear would be created if corporal punishment were abolished the real
problems exist where corporal punishment is used. Even the adoption of
minimal standards does not solve the problem. Admittedly the classroom
is no place for a full-blown criminal trial over each incident. Beyond
that, how few standards can be safely used? Prior permission of the
principal or other administrative official, if not used judiciously becomes
a mere bureaucratic rubber-stamp. Requiring the presence of another
adult does not solve the problem either. After viewing a punishment
session the "safety valve" teacher must either place his or her stamp of
approval on the action or turn on a co-worker, subjecting the "innocent"
teacher to peer pressure for siding against a friend. Putting aside for the
moment these types of abuses where there may be a question of good
faith, consider the quandary of the well-meaning teacher. How far can the
individual teacher go in the use of corporal punishment? This uncertainty
may deter its use except in the moments of rage that are almost certain
to come during a long day. When the teacher is calm and thoughtful,
forceful corporal punishment is not used because of the potential civil
States, flogs beats, wounds, or without justifiable cause, imprisons any of the
crew of such vessel, or withholds from them suitable food and nourishment or
inflicts upon them any corporal or other cruel and unusual punishment, shall
be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
99S. NApmR, REMARKs ON MILrARY LAW AND THE PUNISHMENT OF FLOODINO 27
(1836). The author was a major general in the British Army with over 40 years'
experience as a regimental officer. Although his book does advocate punishments that
would not be accepted today (i.e., blistering), he did advocate the move away from
physical force.
100 Wallington, Corporal Punishment in Schools, 1972 JuRm. Rav. 124, 161 (1972)
(footnotes omitted). See also, Comment, Corporal Punishment in Schools: An
Infringement on Constitutional Freedoms, 20 CLEvE. ST. L. REv. 560, 570 (1971).
101 REITmAN, supra n. 12 at 32.
102 Supra n. 82 and accompanying text.
COMMENTS
17
Arbuckle: Corporal Punishment in the Public Schools
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1974
ARON LAW REvEw
and criminal liability that could be incurred. This puts the teacher in
the position of using corporal punishment only when "pushed." A time
when he or she should use it least.
This uncertainty created by the "reasonableness" standard is being
felt today as evidenced by the following statement of a commentator
on the subject,
... Harris v. Galilley certainly has been a factor in deterring teachers
from using corporal punishment however necessary it may appear
to be. The case seems to stand for the principle that it is always
a question of fact for the jury to determine from the attending
circumstances whether a punishment inflicted is reasonable and
proper or excessive. 03
Any use of minimum standards to control the use of corporal
punishment is subject to one other glaring deficiency. There is a clear
analogy here between the teacher administering discipline in the classroom
and the trial judge presiding over a contempt hearing. Because tempers
often flare in the classroom as in -the courtroom, it is important that the
accuser, judge, and executioner not be the same person.1x 4 Along this
line it has been stated,
The Supreme Court has recognized that the emotional involvement
of the judge who declares a defendant in contempt disqualifies him
from presiding when the contempt issue is tried. Similarly, the school
official who prescribes corporal punishment, if it is permitted at
all, should not be the one who applies it.105
CONCLUSION
Corporal punishment has been a part of our society since recorded
history. Modem thinking in the areas of psychology, political science,
education, and constitutional law has brought this age-old concept into
the arena of doubt. For the past 200 years civilized societies have been
eroding away at the power of government to inflict punishment. Incredible
as it may seem there are many places in the United States today where
it is illegal for the owner of a horse to hit it, while some teachers swat
their pupils almost at will. In a representative system of government such
as ours the millions of school children who face -the paddle daily have no
effective voice. On the other hand, crime in the schools has been on the
rise with new reports of teachers being assaulted coming almost weekly.
Many people fear the breakdown of moral fabric and long for superficial
discipline and order. From a legal point of view, if the precedents are to
control, most teachers in the United States today are burdened with the
103 Morgan, A Look at the Law of Pupil Management, 39 PA. B.Q. 101, 104 (1967)
(footnotes omitted).
1 0 4 See Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 463-66 (1971).
105 Note, Corporal Punishment in the Public Schools, 6 HARv. Civ. RIGHTs-Civ. LIB.
L. REv. 583, 593 (1971).
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right and concommitant responsibility of corporal punishment. Differing
statutory schemes augmented by local regulation dot our legal landscape.
With state law seemingly entrenched in the traditional views, opponents of
corporal punishment are turning to the federal courts and the Constitution
for help. So far, they have found little solace there. However, with the
recent cases on prisoners' rights, application of due process principles
to the schools, and a growing anti-corporal punishment sentiment the
day may not be far off when reason rather than fear will reign in
the nation's schools, and the last vestiges of corporal punishment in
America will be gone.
WILLIAM IRWIN ARBUCKLE, III
* Reforming the Mental Health Law of Ohio
INTRODUCTION
IT WAS A COLD, SNOWY DAY toward the end of November, 1859. C. P.
Wolcott, one of Akron's prominent attorneys, bundled up on the seat
of his "buckboard," was driving his team all about town, trying to obtain
affidavits from various citizens of his community who could testify to his
client's mad delusions, and thereby save him from execution for charges
arising from his attempt to seize the federal army arsenal at Harper's
Ferry, Virginia, the previous October 16th. 1 John Brown, married and the
father of 20 children, was sentenced to be hanged on December 2nd.
2
The client sincerely believed that he was given instructions directly by his
Creator to take the arsenal and thereby to touch off and to lead the war to
free the slaves. His success was to be certain and was divinely promised;
and moreover, divine direction as to the employment of the proper means
to wage this great struggle were assured. He had a strong strain of madness
in his family, possibly descending genetically from his mother.
Governor Wise remained unmoved, and the client and his attorney
lost their race against time. John Brown was hanged, only 47 short days
after his balloon of fantasy had burst.
His soul goes marching on, though, in perhaps more ways than one.
In July, 1972, a stone's throw from where John Brown's home still stands
in Akron, Ohio, J. A. Ciocia, a legal aid lawyer at the Hawthornden State
Hospital, appeared before Judge Evan Reed, in the Common Pleas Court
of Summit County, to argue on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus for
the release of the "Hawthornden -7"; a group of hospitalized mental
patients on whose behalf he claimed denial of counsel for their commit-
ment proceedings, failure to conduct regular, periodic evaluations of their
12 H. Howe, HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS OF OHIO 650 (1907).
22 WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 534, 5 (1960 ed.).
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